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SUPPLIERS OF DEFECTIVE CHATTELS

TORT LIABILITY OF SUPPLIERS OF DEFECTIVE
CHATTELS
Paul A. Leidy*

RECENT case 1 decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
and a recent article 2 appearing in the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review have served to focus attention upon the interesting problem of the liability, on other than warranty principles, of the vendor
of a defective chattel. Because of the line of attack taken in the dissenting opinion and in the article, attention is directed, specifically, to
the vendor's _duty of inspection and, incidentally, to the liability of the
manufacturer of a defective article, the reasons for that liability, and
the question: Are the situations of the actual maker and the mere seller
of a "thing of danger" entirely different?
The case, Ebbert v. Philadelphia Electric Co.,8 involved a defect
in an electric washing machine and wringer. It had been demonstrated,
sold, and installed by the defendant retailer. The defect 4 was not disclosed during the demonstration, for, when the demonstrator touched
one end of the cam shaft, the safety release bar worked perfectly. However, later, when plaintiff tried to release her hand from under the
rollers, she happened to select the other end of the shaft, and the
second release bar, attached at that point, did not operate. It developed
that the cam shaft was bent. The jury, :finding that this fact could have

A

* Professor of Law and Secretary of the Law School, University of Michigan.
A.B., M.A., J.D., Michigan.-Ed.
1
Ebbert v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938).
2
Eldredge, "Vendor's Tort Liability," 89 UN1v. PA. L. REv. 306 (1941). A
splendid article containing an exhaustive and critical analysis of the various situations
in which vendors have been held liable in tort actions; and examination of the sections
of the Restatement of Torts dealing with the vendor's liability; and a consideration of
the few cases in which the courts have found a duty to inspect, Our main interest
is with the latter portion of the article, "Cases Imposing Duty to Inspect," pp. 330-334.
Professor Eldredge's original article has been followed by a series of articles, all
appearing in volume 45 of the DICKINSON LAw REVIEW, in which Professor Farage,
of the Faculty of Law of Dickinson College, and Professor Eldredge discuss and expand
their views as to the duty of inspection on the vendor's part. See Farage, "Must a
Vendor Inspect Chattels before their Sale?-An Answer," 45 DICK. L. REV. 159
(1941); Eldredge, "Vendor's 'Duty' to Inspect Chattels--A Reply," 45 DICK. L. REv.
269 (1941); and Farage, ''Vendor's Duty to Inspect Chattels--A Rejoinder," 45
DtcK. L. REV. 28~ (1941).
8
330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938).
4
The defective part was, interestingly enough, a "safety device," a bent cam
shaft in an electrically driven wringer attached to the electric washer.
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been discovered had the retailer made a reasonably careful inspection,
brought in a verdict for the plaintiff. Judgment entered thereon was
affirmed by the superior court and by the supreme court, one judge 5
dissenting in the upper tribunal.
In the two lower courts, defendant's liability to the vendee-plaintiff
was based on breach of warranty. Justice Maxey, writing the majority
opinion in the supreme court, approved liability on this theory but also
justified plaintiff's recovery on negligence principles, saying
" ... we think an equally solid basis for recovery is defendant's
inadequate performance of the duty of inspection and demonstration. . .. An imperative social duty requires a vendor of a mechanical device to take at least such easily available precautions as are
reasonably likely to prevent serious injury to those who by using
such a device may be exposed to dangers arising from its defective
construction." 5
Professor Eldredge, in the law review article,7 and Justice Drew, in his
dissenting opinion,8 point out some of the weaknesses in the arguments
which led to the conclusion reached by the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. They show, for example, that some of the cases
cited by the majority do not sustain the contention that retailers are
required to make inspections to discover latent, but discoverable, :ffaws.11
They make it quite clear that one section of the Torts Restatement
relied upon by the majority judges applies not only to vendors but to
all suppliers, and covers articles which are "known to be, or likely to
be, dangerous." 10 Reminding us that the decision makes the rule as
to retailers the same as that applicable to manufacturers, they contend
that the positions of the mere vendor and the actual maker are so
different that, in all fairness, no such duty should be placed on the
former. It is to the development of this particular line of argument
that we may, with profit, direct our immediate attention.
5

Justice Drew.
3 30 Pa. at 269, 263-264.
7
''Vendor's Tort Liability," 89 UNrv. PA. L. REV. 306 (1941).
8
330 Pa. 257 at 270-275.
9
These cases are discussed by Justice Drew on page 274. One case, Moore v.
Jefferson Distilling & Denaturing Co., 12 La. App. 405, 123 So. 384 (1929), was
reversed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 169 La. 1156, 126 So. 691 (1930).
10
2 TORTS RESTATEMENT, § 388 (1934), provides that "One who supplies •..
a chattel" is subject to liability if he "knows, or from facts known to him should
realize, that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is
supplied...."
6
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I
"It is difficult to see why the public welfare requires the imposition
upon vendors of this new duty of inspection," Professor Eldredge
suggests. 11 In fact, it is his contention that the public interest "requires
continued adherence to the present weight of authority," which denies
the existence of any such duty. Discussing, specifically, the supposed
difference in the position of the maker and that of the mere seller of a
defective chattel, he says:
"Any reasonable man who manufactures an article which, if
defectively made, is reasonably certain to be a thing of danger and
to place life and limb in peril, can foresee that unless he acts with
competence, skill, attention and care, he is actively creating an
unreasonable risk of harm to a determinable class of persons. . ..
In others words, the manufacturer who carelessly and inattentively creates an automobile, for example, can foresee that he is
engaging in an activity which is unreasonably dangerous to persons
who will use the finished product and to travelers in its path, just
as much as the person who carelessly and inattentively drives even
a perfect automobile can foresee that he is engaging in an activity
which is unreasonably dangerous to himself, others in the car, and
travelers in its path." 12
The rule which makes the manufacturer use reasonable care, even to
the extent of requiring him to make a reasonably careful inspection of
the articles which he sells, is justified by stressing the fact that he created the article. He is said to be guilty of active negligence. True, the
actual shortcoming which brings him liability may have been mere
inattention, the failure to inspect, for example, a wheel which he had
purchased from a reputable wheel manufacturer,18 yet for our purposes
he is guilty of unreasonably dangerous activity. We will not listen to
the suggestion that he did nothing. He is like the driver who did not
put his foot on the brakes. He drove his car carelessly. His wrong was
one of active misconduct, not mere misfeasance. So, too, the manufacturer.
Well and good. How about the vendor? We must look at him
in a different light, it is said. Comparing his position to that of an
11

Eldredge, ''Vendor's Tort Liability," 89 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 306 at 334 (1941).

12

Id. at 307-308.

13 The fact situation in the famous case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N. Y. 382, III N. E. 1050 (1916).
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innocent driver of a defective car, one who is driving his car in complete ignorance of the existence of any flaws, Professor Eldredge says:
". • . By the same token the vendor of that automobile, who
is equally ignorant of its defect, cannot foresee that the sale and
delivery of it to the operator is an act which, is unreasonably
dangerous to him or to anybody else." 14
This portion of the argument lends itself to some such interpretation
as this: to sell a defective car which you, yourself, have made is an
unreasonably risky act; to sell the same car made by another, though
an act, and though dangerous, does not suggest unreasonable risk. But
this construction is eliminated .by Professor Eldredge's next statement:
". . . If liability is imposed upon such a vendor . . . it cannot
be ( as in the case of the manufacturer) upon any theory of active
negligence; the liability must be founded upon what the . . .
vendor failed to do, upon the omission to inspect and discover the
unknown danger." 15
The defective automobile case, then, presents two possibilities. (I) The
defect in the car may be present, at the time its maker sells it, simply
because of the inaction of one of the manufacturer's many employees
(his inattentiveness, his failure to inspect and discover a defect in a
part actually made by another manufacturer, for example), but the
maker is guilty, nevertheless, of active negligence. (2) However, if
the same defect is present when the local agent sells and delivers the
car (present, at this time, because of the inattention, the failure to
inspect, of one of the retailer's employees), we have a situation in which,
if liability is imposed, it cannot be founded upon any theory of active
negligence.
Justice Drew takes the same view of the situation. His criticism
of the majority opinion contains this statement:
"But the majority goes further and finds liability in the failure
to act, in the failure to make an inspection for the defect which
made the article dangerous. This is the rule as applied to manufacturers. But I cannot agree that it should be imposed upon
vendors ...." 16
Had Justice Drew said no more we might fairly interpret his argument
in this fashion: Manufacturers owe, even to third persons, the duty
Eldredge, ''Vendor's Tort Liability," 89 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 306 at 308
(1941).
11> Id.
16 Ebbert v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 330 Pa. 257 at 273, 198 A. 323 (1938).
14
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to use ordinary care in the manufacture and sale of a chattel, and this
duty may be breached by the mere failure to make a reasonably careful
inspection of the parts used in the final assembly, even though those
parts may have been purchased from reputable parts manufacturers;
however, it would be impolitic to impose a similar burden on retailers.
But Justice Drew did not stop with the statement quoted above. He
went on:
" ... The situations of vendor and manufacturer are entirely
different. The manufacturer creates the instrumentality. He has
it within his power to do so carefully. If he is careless he is in the
position of having affirmatively acted in a manner to set up new
risks to those who use his products. The vendor, however, who
does nothing but sell, does not create hazards. He does no more
than pass them on unwittingly." 17

Note the same tendency as in Professor Eldredge's statement to label
the inattention of the vendor as mere inaction, yet to ascribe to similar
shortcomings on the part of the maker the character of activity. We
must not forget that, in both cases, we are dealing with defendants
who unwittingly pass on chattels not safe for use. If either knows, and
fails at least to warn, there will be no doubt as to his liability.18 In
neither case are we concerned with persons who fail to tell their vendees
of latent defects of which the defendants have knowledge. In both cases
we are determining the answer to the same question: Is there a duty
to make a reasonably careful inspection of the article sold to the end
that latent, but discoverable, defects may be detected before sale? Is
there any essential difference, with relation to the risk with which we
are concerned, in the positions of the actual maker and the ultimate
vendor of a defective chattel?

II
It has been customary for courts and writers to bulk manufacturers,
contractors, and vendors as though "they occupied the same role and
their liability was governed by the same rules." This tendency has been
severely criticised; Professor Eldredge calls it "inaccurate" and "misleading." 19 Yet, while we may agree that "in certain situations the
manufacturer of a dangerously defective chattel may be liable for harm
caused by it while the vendor who sells it is not," is it so clear that we
17

ld. at 273-274.
See 2 TORTS RESTATEMENT, § 399 (1934).
19
Eldredge, ''Vendor's Tort Liability," 89 UNIV.
(1941).
18

PA.

L.

REv.

306 at 307
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commit a grievous error when we group these suppliers of chattels
together? True, they do perform different functions in our system of
distribution. But, with relation to the situation which we are discussing,
their actions are similar, and those actions result in risks of a similar
nature. The activity in which they both engage (yes, both) and which
is the real basis for liability, if any, is the same. Their positions, in so
far as the fundamental reason for tort liability is concerned, are not
essentially different.
Should he care to do so, a manufacturer could produce defective
chattels to his heart's content and yet not be liable to anybody. It is
only when he disposes of them, puts dangerous chattels into the stream
of commerce where they will be delivered, eventually, for use, that
unreasonable risk can arise. The activity which justifies liability ( and
it is activity) is not the making, but the supplying, of the dangerously
defective article. The maker, the jobber, and the retailer all engage in
that same type of activity. It is, of course, stretching the point to argue
that the manufacturer is liable not because he is the maker, but rather
in spite of that fact; and yet there is a measure of truth in that conclusion. The argument against extending liability of the manufacturer
to remote vendees, and other third persons, is, in a sense, based upon
the idea that he is only the maker, and does not sell to the ultimate
user. And, while the argument has lost its force, and we now permit
actions against the manufacturer by remote parties, the essential similarity of the positions of the remote maker and the immediate vendor
is proved, rather than denied, by the reasoning which prompted the
adoption of the modern rule of liability. It may be threshing old straw
to discuss the modern trend away from the old rule of nonliability of
manufacturers to those not in privity. But a brief outline of this development may assist us in determining whether there is an entire difference in the positions of our two defendants.

III
The argument against extending liability, so that remote plaintiffs
might recover from a negligent manufacturer, did not deny the existence of the duty to use due care in so far as immediate vendees were
concerned. In fact, in the celebrated case of Winterbottom v. W right,2°
it was said that the only wise procedure was to "confine the right to
recover to those who enter into the contract." And, from the time of
that case to the present, the interesting problems in regard to the lia20

IO M. & W. 109 at II5, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
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bility of manufacturers involved this question of the extension of the
duty to cover those not in privity of contract. By the time Justice Sanborn wrote the opinion in the case of Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing
Machine Co.,21 he could say that it was "well recognized" that the remote maker owed the duty to exercise reasonable care ( might be liable)
to third persons, when his negligence consisted in failing to tell of hidden defects of which he knew. And, further, he was required to use
due care in the manufacture, preparation, and sale of "imminently" or
"inherently" dangerous articles. The decision in the more recent case
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,22 expanded the list of "things of
danger." Where that decision is followed there may be liability to third
persons for injuries resulting from the use of defective chattels of a
type which, if negligently made, would subject remote users and others
to unreasonable risk of harm. Throughout this period, from Winterbottom v. Wright through MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., and to
the present, the defendant manufacturer is stressing the fact that he is
the remote maker and not the vendor. Between himself and the injured plaintiff, he contends, other parties have intervened, among them
the retailer. The chattel has passed from his control, and other hands
have had it in their possession since he parted with it. The final sale,
that of the retailer to the ultimate user, was the real cause of the injury.
This argument seems to be aimed directly at the causation problem. No
doubt our courts, on many occasions, justified the rule of nonliability
to those not in privity of contract on a causation theory. 28 We no longer
accept that explanation; we realize that the maker's activity in placing
the article in the stream of commerce (his sale, intended, eventually,
to place the chattel in the hands of the user) is a sufficient contributing
factor to justify liability on that score. But, pursuing this point as it
concerns the relative positions of the maker and the ultimate vendor, it
is true that, of all the sales required to get this defective chattel into a
position where it is unreasonably likely to do harm, the one which
forges the most important link in the risk chain is that of the retailer
to the purchaser.
In fairness to the remote maker, it must be admitted that he can
state his arguments in terms of unreasonable risk. An automobile, even
one with a defective wheel, does not present a case of unreasonable risk
so long as it remains in the plant of the maker. Nor is it a "thing of
21

(C. C. A. 8th, 1903) 120 F. 865.
217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. rn50 (1916).
28
See, for example, the opinion of Justice Sanborn in the case of Huset v. J. I.
Case Threshing Machine Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1903) 120 F. 865.
22
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danger" as it lies on the top of a cross-country hauling contrivance. As
a matter of fact it is not even unreasonably dangerous as it stands in
the show window of the local agency. The final sale and delivery, for
immediate use, is the incident which produces the situation involving
unreasonable risk of immediate foreseeable harm. We do not accept
this explanation in its entirety. It stresses, unduly, the contribution
of the final vendor, and minimizes the now-recognized contribution of
the maker. Just what are the contributions of those two vendors?
Time was, we may assume, when most of the chattels were delivered by the maker directly to the ultimate user. As more modern
methods of production and distribution came into use, the jobber or the
retailer became the maker's vendee. As to those most likely to be
subjected to unreasonable risk of harm if the chattel was defective ( ultimate users and third persons in the vicinity of the article's use), it is
now the retailer who performs the act which is likely to result in the
foreseeable injury. His sale and delivery, for immediate use, in most
cases without the likelihood 24 of further inspection, becomes the risky
activity which, in the _old days, was that of the maker himself. But this
shift does not blind us to the fact that the maker has also made a contribution which gives rise to the duty to exercise care. His original sale
is but the forerunner of an eventual sale for use. If he elects to sell
without being careful to see that the article is reasonably fit for that
eventual use, we fasten liability on him, not because he is the maker,
but because he is a negligent vendor. We advise him to be careful in
the making of the article because he intends to sell it, and if he does sell
a defectively made article he will have subjected remote users to
unreasonable risk.
Our mythical manufacturer, the one who made a quantity of defective chattels knowingly, may sell them to a junk dealer for scrap,
without liability. And if the junk dealer, contrary to his stated intentions,
should sell one of the defective cars, we may assume that the manufacturer would not be liable to a pedestrian injured while the car was
being driven by the junk man's vendee. 25 It is not the making of the
24

That the likelihood of further inspection being made is more important than
the presence of an opportunity for such inspection, see Herschtal v. Stewart & Ardern,
[1940] I K. B. 155, commented upon in 56 L. Q. REV. 20 (1940).
25 We may agree with Professor Eldredge, ''Vendor's Tort Liability," 89 UNIV.
PA. L. REv. 306 at 309 (1941), that one could sell a dangerously defective chattel to
one who knew the facts, though the vendee should use the article and injure a third
person, without liability on the part of the vendor. "It seems likely that in any ordinary
case such intervening negligence by the purchaser would be considered extraordinary
and would operate as a superseding cause euen if tJie uendor's sale could be considered
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chattel which prompts us to impose the duty to exercise care on the
manufacturer; it is the sale and delivery for eventual use. And if the
sale and delivery for eventual use is activity, so, too, is the sale and
delivery for immediate use.
In a recent English case,26 Lord Atkin, referring to the relationships which give rise to the duty to exercise care, offers this suggestion:
"It is remarkable how difficult it is to find in the English
authorities statements of general application defining the relations
between parties that give rise to the duty. The Courts are concerned with the particular relations which come before them in
actual litigation, and it is sufficient to say whether the duty exists
in those circumstances."
Continuing, he adds:
" •.• The rule that you are to love your neighbor becomes in
law, you must not injure your neighbor, and the lawyer's question,
Who is my neighbor? receives a restricted reply•... The answer
seems to be-persons who are so closely and directly affected by my
act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as
being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or
omissions which are called in question." 27
Surely, if the maker of a defective chattel who has placed the article
in the general stream of commerce is so situated with relation to the
ultimate user as to permit us to agree that the latter is "closely and
directly affected by that act," the vendor who actually puts the same
article in the user's hands is under a duty to exercise due care with
regard to that sale and delivery. If the "particulars in which reasonable
care is usually necessary" when we are concerned with the manufacturer
include "making such inspections and tests • . . as the manufacturer
should recognize as reasonably necessary to secure the production of a
safe article," 28 is it clear that a retailer can have performed his duty
when he fails to make a reasonably careful inspection?
Can it be, as suggested by Justice Drew, that "if [the maker] is
careless he . . . sets up new risks to those who use his products; the
vendor, however, who does nothing but sell, does not create any new
hazards"? The risk created by the maker cannot take effect until the
retailer creates the hazard involved in actually placing the defective
as an act of negligence with respect to the third person.', (Italics added.) If the sale
is not negligent, the making was as clearly innocent.
26
Donoghne v. Stevenson, [1932] A. C. 562 at 579.
27
Id. at 580.
28
2 TORTS RESTATEMENT 1075, comment to § 395 (1934).
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chattel in the hands of the user. Due care on the vendor's part may
eliminate the risk. And there is a transfer in the identity of the persons
subjected to the risk. While the retailer had the car in his possession,
he, his employees, prospective purchasers, and pedestrians and other
drivers, were in the zone of danger. His act, the sale, has probably
removed the retailer, his employees, and other prospects from the zone,
and substituted the plaintiff and his family. It is a new risk as to them,
at least. Nor is this one of the situations in which we may resort to the
proposition, so splendidly developed by Professor Bohlen,20 that as a
general rule, affirmative obligations are imposed only as the price of
a benefit. The real benefit to the manufacturer arises from the sale of
the article to the intermediary, from its profitable disposition. And the
same is true, of course, as to the retailer. Discussions of the use-benefit
and the sale-benefit,80 however helpful if we were discussing the relative positions of the vendor and the vendee, avail us little when we attempt to use them in this situation where the objects of our concern are
both vendors. Nor is this the type of situation in which we profit from
an attempt to weigh the relative utility of the risks. One would not
care to try to evaluate the contribution of these two functionaries ( the
maker and the retailer) in our system of production and distribution,
in so far as they make, or merely sell, flawless articles. And there would
seem to be no social utility either in the making or the selling of defective chattels.

IV
Perhaps our apparent disagreement arises, as is so frequently the
case, from a failure to agree upon a definition of terms. The assertion
is made that there is "no general duty of inspection" on the part of
the retailer. There is no denial, of course, of the existence of the duty
to exercise reasonable care in the sale of the chattel. Justice Drew,
in his dissenting opinion, discusses instances of the vendor's negligence
in such sales. True, he starts with the proposition that "As a general
rule the vendor of an article manufactured by another has no obligation other than that in contract, expressly undertaken or implied by
law." But he adds, immediately, "There are, of course, exceptions." 81
He refers to the admitted liability of the vendor who knows, or ought
29 Bohlen, "The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort," 53 UNiv.
PA. L. REv. [44 AM. L. REG. (N.S.)] 209, 273, 337 (1905), reprinted BOHLEN,
STUDIES JN,THE LAw OF ToRTS 33 (1926).
39
Eldredge, "Vendor's Tort Liability," 89 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 306 at 321
(19-4-1).
31
Ebbert v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 330 Pa. 257 at 270, 198 A. 323 (1938).
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to realize, that the article is likely to cause harm, and to the liability
of the retailer who sells the wrong article. He recognizes liability, of course, in situations in which the vendee has properly relied
upon the vendor's tacit or express assurance that the article is safe.
Similarly, Professor Eldredge, in his article, gives us a scholarly and
exhaustive analysis 32 of the various situations in which vendors may be
held liable. There is, then, no denial of the fact that the vendor may
be guilty of negligence in the sale of a chattel. The argument comes
to this, apparently: in the Ebbert 38 case, the defendant owed no duty
of inspection, and there is no general duty of inspection on the part of
retailers. If the phrase "no general duty of inspection" is to be taken
literally, much of the criticism levelled at the majority opinion in the
Ebbert case loses force. After all, the court was required to decide
whether a jury might properly find that defendant negligent. A most
significant portion of Justice Maxey's statement is directed at retailers
who pass on "mechanical devices" and who pass those devices on without taking "easily available precautions as are reasonably likely to
prevent serious injury." The same court, with Justice Maxey again
writing the opinion, could decide, with perfect consistency, that a
retailer who sold a cake of soap would not be liable for injuries caused
by the presence of a needle buried in the bar.34 The majority opinion
admits the validity of the rule of non-liability in the so-called "original
package" cases. Whether or not we approve of some of the arguments
made, we must remember that Justice Maxey said, quite specifically,
that "This is one of those cases in which the action was properly
brought against the vendor." 85 Let us assume that the majority misquoted the Torts Restatement, and that Justice Maxey and his colleagues misunderstood the decisions in certain cases upon which they
relied. Let us admit that they relied on a case which was later reversed,
and that the only case which supports the decision was wrongly decided.
We still have our question in front of us. Should there be, in a case
like the Ebbert case, a duty on the retailer's part to make reasonable
inspection? To put our problem more generally, may we properly find
a retailer guilty of negligence when his only shortcoming consists in
82 ''Vendor's Tort Liability," 89 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 306 (1941). That portion
of the article which is devoted to liability for the sale of chattels known to be dangerous and to the effect of representations is most helpful. Id. 310-324.
88 Ebbert v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938).
H See, for example, Barrango v. Hinckley Rendering Co., 230 Mass. 93, 119
N. E. 746 (1918), and Hasbrouck v. Armour & Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W. 157
(1909).
85
330 Pa. 257 at 265.
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a failure to make a reasonably careful inspection for discoverable
defects?
V
What may I reasonably expect, today, if I buy, at retail, an automobile, a washing machine, an iceless refrigerator, a bar of soap, a fur
coat, or a chair? Is it possible that a reasonably careful retailer can
sell me any, or all, of these articles without making any sort of an
inspection whatever?
We may agree, with Professor Eldredge, that the merchant who
sells my wife a :fifty-nine cent wrapper has not been negligent simply
because he failed to run his hands through every wrapper in the pile
to see if a basting needle has been left in a hem; and that the court
which permitted the jury so to :find undoubtedly made a mistake.86
But why? Because there is no general duty of inspection? Or, rather,
because it is clear that, if the only evidence of negligence was that just
suggested, there is not sufficient evidence to take that issue to the jury
in that particular case? Though we admit the nonliability of the
wrapper-retailer on these facts, does it follow that a retail automobile
dealer can deliver a new car at my front door and escape liability for
injuries resulting from easily discoverable flaws?
What should a reasonably prudent automobile retailer do, in the
matter of making inspection? When he delivers the car the speedometer may show that it has been driven some distance. I know that some
cars come to my local dealer on a long distance hauling contrivance,
and that some are driven down from the factory. I note that the car
has been washed and polished. Am I to understand that no inspection
whatever has been made except at the plant in Flint? Or may I reasonably assume that a careful dealer will have put the car through some
sort of test before delivering it to me for use? 37 Of course I cannot
assume that the local agent has disassembled the car, nor any of its
most important parts. H;e has not torn down the steering mechanism,
nor the transmission; nor has he taken off the wheels and greased them
again. If trouble comes because of defects in steering, or in the transmission, or from inside the wheels, we may agree that I must look to
the manufacturer, for reasonably careful inspection by the manufacturer
86

Garvey v. Namm, 136 App. Div. 815, 121 N. Y. S. 442 (1910).
The interesting case of Shroder v. Barron-Dady Motor Co., (Mo. 1937) l II
S. W. (2d) 66, discussed by Professor Eldredge, ''Vendor's Tort Liability," 89 Univ.
PA. L. REv. 306 at 320 (1941), and commented upon in 22 MINN. L. REv. 743
(1938), contains a discussion of the duty of the ordinary retail automobile dealer and
the greater duty of a distributor.
37
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might have caught those flaws, but it would have required an overcareful retailer's inspection to catch those defects locally. But if the
brakes are "grabby," and I learn of that as I unsuccessfully try to obey
the first "Stop" sign I encounter, would it be manifestly unfair to suggest that this situation indicates negligence on the part of my vendor?
A vendor may be negligent because of something he said, or left unsaid; his negligence may consist in something he did; is it possible that
this "failure to act" is so potent as to relieve him from liability? What
would our fictional standard man have done under the same or similar
circumstances? And, if our defendant retailer has fallen short of that
standard, can we simply label his shortcoming "inaction," and let him
escape liability?
Recent cases suggest that one who sells and delivers, for immediate
use, a rebuilt and reconditioned car, has a rather definite duty with
regard to inspection and repair, to the end that the car will not become
a menace upon the highways.88 The lessor of a "Drive-Yourself'' car
has long had the duty to inspect and repair, so that cars which he leases
will be reasonably safe for the use to which, it is assumed, they will be
put,89 and this though the chattel was made by a third person.40 The
Torts Restatement suggests that this duty is placed on the lessor, when
the chattel is leased for immediate use, because the fact that it is so
leased makes it unreasonable for the lessor to expect that the lessee
will do more than give it the most cursory inspection. Is the situation
entirely different when I buy the same sort of chattel for immediate
use? What must the vendor reasonably expect in that case; and what
may I reasonably assume as to his actions in the light of those expectations?
Consider the effect of the fact that the vendor has himself purchased
the automobile from a reputable manufacturer. Should that fact, in
itself, negative the duty of inspection? It does not seem to have that
effect in the case of the "Drive-Yourself'' lessor. True, a lessor who
has purchased a chattel from a maker who has a fine reputation may
rely, the Restaters say,41 to a large extent upon the article as being well
88
See, for example, the case of Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, (C. C. A. 8th,
1939) 102 F. (2d) 373, and cases which approve the rule there laid down: McLeod
v. Holt Motor Co., 208 Minn. 473, 294 N. W. 479 (1940); Nelson v. Healey, 151
Kan. 512, 99 P. (2d) 795 (1940); and Jones v. Raney Chevrolet Co., 217 N. C.
693, 9 S. E. (2d) 395 (1940).
39
Mitchell v. Lonergan, 285 Mass. 266, 189 N. E. 39 (1934), and cases there
cited.
40
2 ToRTS RESTATEMENT 1096, comment to § 408 (1934).
41
Id. 1096.
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made. The fact remains, however, that "If the chattel is made by a
third person, the lessor is required to exercise reasonable care to inspect
it before turning it over to the lessee." 42 There seems to be no good
reason for refusing to impose a somewhat similar duty on the vendor.
Time and space do not permit of extended discussion as to a purchaser's reasonable expectations when he buys a bar of soap, a package
of cereal, an electric refrigerator, or a fur coat. But, as we consider the
propriety of recognizing a duty to inspect, on the part of retailers, we
may expect to find that they will furnish illustrations of the proper
limits upon the retailer's obligation to his vendee.

VI
The imposition of a duty to inspect, and permitting the issue of
negligence to get to the jury, in any given case, would no doubt depend
upon a variety of factors. The nature of the article ( the likelihood
that, if it is defective, serious rather than trivial harm may be expected
to follow its use) ; the practicability of such an inspection, on the retailer's part, as would have been necessary to expose the particular
defect; the likelihood that an inspection by the user would catch the
flaw before dangerous use-these factors, and perhaps others, will play
their part. Any one of the limiting factors might negative liability in
a given case; a combination of two or more will simply make the case
a clearer one.
For example, consider the ·case of the needle in the bar of soap
purchased by the retailer from a reputable soap manufacturer. 43 The
fact that he has purchased it from a reputable source would certainly
reduce, quantitatively, the care which a reasonably prudent corner drug
store operator would be expected to use. And the fact that, to catch a
buried defect in a bar of soap, he would have to destroy it ( cut it open)
or use some such fantastic device as an electric eye ( unreasonably expensive, under the circumstances) would lower the amount of care to
the irreducible minimum. A court could say, quite properly, there is
no duty to make such an inspection in such a case; it is similar to, if not
an illustration of, the "original package" exception to which Justice
Maxey referred. With equal propriety a court could say, if the only
evidence of negligence in the case was the retailer's failure to inspect,
that there was not sufficient evidence of negligence to take the case to
the jury.
42

48

Id. 1096.
Hasbrouck v. Armour & Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W. 157 (1909), for
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On the other hand, assume that I have ordered, from my retailer,
an iceless refrigerator. It comes, crated, to my home; in that condition
it is valueless to me, so the retailer or his agent uncrates it and installs it.
In the night, fumes from the poorly constructed machine cause serious
injury to members of my family, under such conditions as to suggest
no negligence on their part. The defect which caused the trouble was
one which could have been discovered had the retailer taken "easily
available precautions"; the flaw was one which he could have detected
had he made a reasonably careful inspection. Am I limited to an action
against the maker of the article? Or should the fact that, with little
effort on his part, he could have prevented this injury suggest the imposition of a duty on the vendor to take those precautions? It may be
true that the sale of an uncrated stove, purchased from a reputable
stove manufacturer, should involve no inspection whatever; and that
the mere uncrating and installation of such a stove, involving only the
making of a connection with the gas already piped into my home, would
involve no liability on the stove seller who merely made the connection,
saw that it was tight, and went his way, if the injury came from a defect
in the combustion chamber.44 Yet, it may well be that a reasonably
prudent stove seller, today, would try it out before leaving my home.
We may agree that a prudent retailer would not run his hands
through a hundred wrappers to find a basting needle in a hem; does it
follow that the vendor of an expensive fur coat would sell one without
making an inspection which would have caught a furrier's knife in the
lining? 45 And, if the latter case results favorably for the vendor, must
we conclude that the Ebbert case was wrongly decided? There is no
inconsistency in limiting liability to cases involving chattels of a type
likely to result in serious, rather than trivial, injury, and most of us
will admit, I am sure, that many of the modern mechanical devices fit
the former description. If the article is of a type not likely to result in
serious harm, and it was purchased from a reputable maker, this combination of factors would justify refusing to let a jury find negligence.
If the article is determined to be one of the dangerous type, if negligently made, the fact that it was purchased from a reputable manufacturer should not negative liability if the vendor failed to use the
care which one in his position would use.
4

4' See, for example, the recent Michigan case, Camden Fire Ins. Co. v. Peterman,
278 Mich. 615, 270 N. W. 807 (1937).
45
Miller v. Svensson, 189 Ill. App. 355 (1914).
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VII
What possible objections can be raised to such an approach? There
is nothing ~ovel about it. We used to say that, in so far as the condition of premises was concerned, "a landowner owes no duty to a trespasser." Then came the "turntable doctrine"; then the so-called "attractive nuisance doctrine"; and now, today, we recognize liability
to trespassing children in many cases, and we may determine whether
or not the case falls within, or outside, the limits of the protective rule
by considering factors quite similar to those suggested above.46
Nor does the imposition of a duty of inspection on retailers leave
out of consideration the fact that the positions of the manufacturer and
the mere vendor are not exactly similar. To continue with our automobile case, for example, we realize that, even though much of the
job is a matter of assembly, a careful car manufacturer will have testing
devices which a prudent retail dealer could not afford, and so would not
be expected to have. Nor is the car assembler able to make some of the
tests which the parts maker could make as he produced the part. The
finished article, in each case, cannot be inspected in a fashion which was
possible before its completion. But, the fact that the parts were purchased from a reputable concern does not relieve the manufacturer
from making certain available tests. Defective wheels do pass inspection even though made by reputable wheel concerns; so we
ask the user of the wheels to make a reasonably careful inspection of
the wheels and the car of which they are a part. We would not expect
a similar inspection of the wheels, nor of the car, by the retailer.47 But,
no inspection whatever? We would not permit the druggist to be held
for a failure to catch the needle in the bar of soap because he did not
use an electric eye to catch such hidden defects. It might be that a soap
manufacturer who did not have some such inspection method could be
found negligent if this needle-in-the-soap situation should become
something more than a novelty. We do recognize a difference in the
positions of the two vendors. The nature and extent of the inspection
required would be quite different.
Is it possible that, from the standpoint of the probability of harm,
46

There is a very helpful discussion of the factors to be considered in cases of this
sort in Lone Star Gas Co. v. Parsons, 159 Okla. 52, 14 P. (2d) 369 (1932).
47
The New York court, in Garvey v. Namm, 136 App. Div. 815, 121 N. Y. S.
442 (19rn), and in Santise v. Martins, Inc., 258 App. Div. 663, 17 N. Y. S. (2d)
741 (1940), distinguishes between "mechanical tests" (which, the court says, would
not be required in the case of a retailer) and "inspection alone." Failure to detect
flaws which would have been discovered by mere inspection resulted in liability in
both cases.
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due care on the part of the retailer indicates no need for inspection,
while it is required of the manufacturer? We may assume that, in view
of the myriad articles produced, relatively few defective articles are
offered for ultimate sale. But, though the natural spur of competition,
and the imposition of a duty to remote vendees, will have their effect,
it is not likely that either or both will eliminate entirely the fl.ow of
dangerous chattels into commerce. Men will be slack, on occasion, and
defective articles-though not many-will reach the retailers' stores.
The number of such articles which any one retailer will be likely to
have in his stock would probably be very small. Is it asking too much
to insist that he use reasonable care ( even to the extent of making some
sort of inspection) to see that those which he offers for sale are relatively free from.easily discoverable defects?
To the suggestion that, if it is relatively easy for the retailer to
discover the defect, would not reasonable men expect the user to make
a similarly simple inspection? there are two short answers. First, one
of the factors suggested covers this situation: if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the user will catch the defect, we would expect no liability on the part of the mere vendor. Second, whether users should make
such inspections will be disclosed when we receive the jury's answer on
the issue of contributory negligence.48 To the suggestion that, as our
plaintiff already has one action, against the manufacturer, there is no
good reason to give him another, there are, apparently, two similarly
short answers. As Professor Eldredge has pointed out/9 the plaintiff
usually has two actions now, one against the negligent maker, and "In
many cases . . . a cause of action against even an innocent vendor for
breach of an express or implied warranty." If he has two actions now,
when the vendor is innocent, there can be no great objection to two
actions if the vendor is negligent. And, second, we are no longer in the
habit of denying relief, as against one defendant, because some one
else has contributed, wrongfully, to the plaintiff's injury. If our vendor
has acted carefully, that is reason enough to deny recovery against him.

VIII
We realize, today, that, in the law of torts, we indulge in a bit of
social engineering.50 We may admit, frankly, that many of our so-called
"rules" are merely compromises. The decision we make, in a case of
48
This issue was submitted to the jury in the Ebbert case, 330 Pa. 257 at 262,
198 A. 323 (1938).
49
Eldredge, "Vendor's Tort Liability," 89 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 306 at 334
(1941).
50
PROSSER, TORTS 15 (1941).
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the type now under consideration, presents the necessity of compromising between the "impolicy" of imposing a duty which may appear to
be burdensome and the probability of harm which urges its imposition. u
Admitting, quite frankly, that in the last analysis our question becomes
one of policy, what do the facts in the Ebbert case, and the factual
situation as to vendors generally, indicate as to the proper answer to
our question?
We may assume that the defendant in the Ebbert case would not be
asked to take a sample of the steel used in the cam shaft to which the
safety release bar was attached, and have it tested at an independent
laboratory; nor would we expect the retailer to have such testing equipment in his own establishment. 52 But, if the fl.aw in the shaft could be
detected by merely lifting a steel cover, would the vendor, though a
mere retailer, be reasonably careful if he failed to do that simple act?
The purchaser might lift the cover, see that the shaft was bent, and yet
not realize that injury impended. Could a reasonably competent seller
of an electric washing machine, who has to demonstrate the safety
features of the instrumentality, see the same bent condition and have
no idea of the danger involved? We say to the retailer of articles in
cans that the suspicious bulge in the can is enough to warn him of possible defects, 58 and while he does not know of the defect he should
realize it.54 Would it be an intolerable burden were we to say to the
defendant retailer of an electric washer, "You should take easily available precautions, such as merely lifting a cover, and, if you do not do
that, the defect is one which you ought to have known about?" There
is a suggestion, in the majority opinion in the Ebbert case, that "The
chamber containing the safety device was open at the bottom and a
mere glance at the cam shaft would have disclosed the imperfect condition." 55 If that was true, there was a question for the jury, it would
seem.
While one may not overlook the possibility of oversympathetic reactions on the part of jurors, it is surely possible to overestimate the
51

This suggestion is developed in Lone Star Gas Co. v. Parsons, I 59 Okla. 52,
14 P. (2d) 369 (1932).
52
See Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240
N. W. 392 (1932), for a standard of care required of boiler manufacturers. No one
would suggest similar tests on the part of a jobber or retailer of boilers.
58
This type of fact situation is discussed by Professor Eldredge, "Vendor's Tort
Liability," 89 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 306 at 328 (1941).
54
Cf. 2 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, § 388 (1934).
55
Ebbert v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 330 Pa. 257 at 261, 198 A. 323 (1938).
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importance of that factor. 56 We have not let it deter us from imposing
the burden of inspection on the chattel maker, though we realize that
in torts cases generally the jury is quite apt to be plaintiff-minded.57
We have thought that the probability of harm was sufficiently clear
to justify the imposition of the duty on the remote manufacturer. If
the probability of harm still remains, when the retailer goes into action,
we should not overemphasize the possibility of unjust judgments and
minimize the likelihood that relatively few cases presenting the possibility of injustice will get to the jury or escape reversal in an upper
court.
In the most recent text book on the subject of torts, the author,
Professor Prosser, makes this statement as to the possibility of negligence on the part of the vendor of chattels: 58
"The seller's negligence may take a number of forms. It may
consist of a misrepresentation of the character of the goods, or of
their fitness for a particular use. It may consist of a failure to
disclose to the buyer facts of which the seller has knowledge which
make the goods dangerous for the buyer's purpose. It may take
the form of a sale to a person obviously incompetent to deal with
the goods, as in the case of an explosive sold to a child. Most frequently, it consists merely in failure to exercise reasonable care
to inspect the goods to discover defects, or in preparing them for
sale."
It does seem clear that, in all the cases mentioned, the passing on of
articles defectively made involves activity which may be fraught with
unreasonable risk to the buyer, or to others who may be expected to
be in the vicinity of the chattel's probable use. And to suggest that a
retailer's negligence may consist merely in failure to make a reasonably
careful inspection when (a) with very little expense or inconvenience
he can make an inspection which would disclose the defect, and (b)
such an inspection would be practicable, and ( c) there is little likelihood
that the user will make an effective inspection in advance of injury,
and ( d) the presence of the defect would be likely to result in serious
bodily harm, would not impose an unfairly heavy burden on retailers
generally.
56
The development in the field of liability for emotional disturbances negligently
produced has been possible because of a growing realization that, in earlier days, this
fear was overemphasized, as was the possibility of fraud.
57
And particularly so as against nonresident defendant manufacturers?
58
PRoSSER, ToRTS 667-668 (1941).

